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Summary Effective mitigation of climate change will require far-reaching transformations of 
electricity, heat, agricultural, transport and other systems. The energy studies and modelling research 
that so often dominates academic and policy debates provide valuable insights into these transitions, 
but remain constrained by their focus on rational decision-making and their neglect of non-linear 
dynamics and broader social processes. This review paper describes insights from a complementary 
socio-technical approach that addresses the interdependent social, political, cultural, and technical 
processes of transitions. Focusing on the ‘Multi-Level Perspective’ (MLP), transitions are 
conceptualized as arising from the alignment of processes within and between three analytical levels: 
niche-innovations, socio-technical regimes and the socio-technical landscape. This analytical 
framework is illustrated with a case study of the German electricity transition and used to appraise low-
carbon transitions in several other sectors. We end by articulating four lessons for managing low-
carbon transitions. 
 
Keywords: energy transitions; socio-technical approach; multi-level perspective  
 
1. Introduction  
Effective mitigation of climate change will require simultaneous transitions towards low-carbon 
electricity, heat, agricultural, transport and in other systems. The energy studies and modelling 
approaches that dominate academic and policy debates provide valuable insights into the nature and 
characteristics of these transitions, but also have several important limitations.1 
Firstly, such studies have a limited representation of the range of actors involved (mostly firms, 
consumers and exogenous policymakers) and the manner in which they make decisions (mostly 
rational, optimizing). Secondly, transitions are conceptualized as tame processes, consisting of the 
steady deployment of low-carbon technologies represented via smooth diffusion curves. Thirdly, IAMs 
in particular optimize on one dimension (social surplus or cost), identifying optimal or ‘first-best’ 
pathways, even if these include technologies that are socially controversial or not yet feasible, like bio-
energy with carbon capture and storage.2 
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 Following the 2015 Paris agreement, climate change debates are moving from abstract 
modelling towards real-world implementation of solutions. This requires the development of more 
realistic and situated understandings of low-carbon transitions that can alleviate the above limitations. 
Firstly, transitions should be conceptualized as involving a wider range of actors, which include not 
only firms and consumers, but also civil society groups, the media, local residents, city authorities, 
political parties, advisory bodies, and government ministries.3 The actions of these groups are guided 
not only by important and well-documented cost-benefit calculations, but also by entrenched beliefs, 
conflicting values, competing interests, unequal resources and complex social relations. 
Secondly, low-carbon transitions are not only about the market diffusion of new technologies, 
but also about changes in user practices, cultural discourses, and political struggles. Transitions are 
therefore not tame, but disruptive, contested and non-linear processes. Disruptive, because they 
threaten the economic positions and business models of some of the largest and most powerful 
industries (e.g. oil, cars, electric utilities, agro-food), which are likely to protect their vested interests.4 
Contested, because actors disagree about the desirability of different low-carbon solutions and often 
resist their implementation (e.g. onshore wind turbines, carbon capture and storage). Non-linear, 
because climate change policies and low-carbon innovations can experience setbacks, accelerations or 
cycles of hype and disappointment (e.g. current climate policies in the UK, USA and Australia).5 
Thirdly, low-carbon transitions require complex negotiations and trade-offs between multiple 
objectives and constraints, including cost-effectiveness, equity, social acceptance (legitimacy), political 
feasibility, resilience and flexibility.6 The uncertain, long term benefits of carbon mitigation lacks 
salience and need to be aligned with other objectives to gain stakeholder support. 
Fourthly, low-carbon transitions are goal-oriented or ‘purposive’ in the sense of addressing the 
problem of climate change. This makes them different from historical transitions which were largely 
‘emergent’, with entrepreneurs exploiting the commercial opportunities offered by new technology.7 8 
Since climate protection is a public good, private actors (e.g. firms, consumers) have limited incentives 
to address it owing to free-rider problems and prisoner’s dilemmas. This means that public policy must 
play a central role by changing economic frame conditions (via taxes, subsidies, regulations, standards) 
and supporting the emergence and deployment of low-carbon innovations. However, substantial policy 
changes involve political struggles and public debate because: “[w]hatever can be done through the 
State will depend upon generating widespread political support from citizens within the context of 
democratic rights and freedoms”.9 These considerations reinforce the point that low-carbon transitions 
involve interactions between multiple societal groups. 
To address these challenges, this Review builds on calls10 11 to include more social science in 
climate mitigation research and presents a ‘socio-technical’ framework for understanding and 
managing low-carbon transitions. This framework has guided work within the Sustainability 
Transitions Research Network (http://www.transitionsnetwork.org/), which has more than 1300 
members globally. The following section introduces the sociotechnical perspective, while Section 3 
illustrates these ideas with a case study of the German electricity transition. Section 4 reflects on the 
status of low-carbon transitions in different sectors, while Section 5 draws some lessons for managing 
those transitions. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Levels and phases in sociotechnical transitions 
The Multi-Level Perspective (MLP) argues that transitions entail major changes in the ‘socio-technical 
systems’ that provide societal functions such as mobility, heat, housing and sustenance.12 These 
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systems consist of an interdependent and co-evolving mix of technologies, supply chains, 
infrastructures, markets, regulations, user practices and cultural meanings.13 Sociotechnical systems 
develop over many decades, and the alignment of these different elements leads to path dependence 
and resistance to change. Existing systems are maintained, defended and incrementally improved by 
incumbent actors, whose actions are guided by deeply entrenched rules and institutions – termed 
‘socio-technical regimes’. Figure 1 provides an example of the car-based transportation system, which 
in most Western countries accounts for 80-85% of passenger-kilometers. This system is sustained by 
formal and informal institutions such as the preferences and habits of car drivers; the cultural 
associations of car-based mobility with freedom, modernity and individual identity; the skills and 
assumptions of transport planners; the technical capabilities of car manufacturers, suppliers and repair 
shops; and so on.14 
 
Figure 1: Schematic figure of socio-technical system of auto-mobility 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The MLP argues that sociotechnical transitions involve interactions between the incumbent regime, 
radical ‘niche-innovations’ and the ‘sociotechnical landscape’. Niche-innovations are emerging social 
or technical innovations that differ radically from the prevailing sociotechnical system and regime, but 
are able to gain a foothold in particular applications, geographical areas or markets (e.g. the military), 
or with the help of targeted policy support. The socio-technical landscape refers to broader contextual 
developments that influence the sociotechnical regime and over which regime actors have little or no 
influence. Landscape developments comprise both slow-changing trends (e.g. demographics, ideology, 
spatial structures, geopolitics) and exogenous shocks (e.g. wars, economic crises, major accidents, 
political upheavals). The MLP’s key claim is that transitions come about through the alignment of 
processes within and between the three levels, as depicted in Figure 2. Hence, to fully explain 
transitions it is necessary to identify these processes and the complex interactions between them; while 
to effectively shape the speed and direction of transitions it is necessary to influence several of these 
processes simultaneously. 
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Figure 2: Multi-level perspective on sociotechnical transitions (adjusted from ref. 13) 
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The MLP distinguishes four phases in these decades-long transition processes.15 In the first phase, 
radical innovations emerge in niches, on the fringe of existing regimes. Innovator networks are 
unstable, uncertain, experimental, and fragile, propagating different design options - many of which 
will fail. 
In the second phase, the innovation enters small market niches that provide resources for further 
development and specialization. The innovation develops a trajectory of its own, with a dominant 
design emerging and with the expectations and associated rules beginning to stabilize. 
In the third phase the innovation breaks through more widely and begins to compete head-on 
with the established regime. On the one hand, this process depends upon drivers internal to the niche 
such as price/performance improvements, scale and learning economies, the development of 
complementary technologies and infrastructures, positive cultural discourses and support from 
powerful actors. On the other hand, the incumbent regime begins to destabilize as a consequence of 
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persistent internal problems (e.g. urban air quality), landscape pressures (e.g. rising oil prices) or a 
combination of the two, thereby creating windows of opportunity for niche-innovations. Table 1 
summarizes some typical drivers of niche momentum, along with typical sources of tension within 
regimes. Struggles between niche-innovations and existing regimes typically play out on multiple 
dimensions, including: economic competition between old and new technologies; business struggles 
between new entrants and incumbents; political struggles over adjustments in regulations, standards, 
subsidies and taxes; and discursive struggles over problem framings and social acceptance. 
The fourth phase is characterized by regime substitution, with the widespread adoption of the 
new innovations being accompanied by far-reaching adjustments in infrastructures, policies, industrial 
and market structures, lifestyles and views on normality. The new regime becomes institutionalized and 
increasingly taken-for-granted. 
 
Table 1: Drivers of niche momentum and regime tensions 
 Endogenous niche momentum Regime tensions 
Techno-
economic 
Price/performance improvements as a result of 
R&D, learning-by-doing, scale economies, 
complementary technologies, and network 
externalities. 
Technical failures, disruption of 
infrastructures, accumulating negative 
externalities (e.g. CO2 emissions). 
Business New entrants or incumbents from other sectors 
are more likely to drive radical innovation than 
traditional incumbents. Their success may lead 
to ‘innovation races’ when other firms follow a 
first mover. 
Shrinking markets, economic difficulties in 
incumbent industries, loss of confidence in 
existing technologies and business models, 
reorientation towards alternatives. 
Social Growing support coalitions and constituencies 
improve available skills, finance and political 
clout. 
Disagreement and fracturing of social 
networks, defection of key social groups from 
the regime. 
Political Advocacy coalitions lobby for policy changes 
that support the niche innovation such as 
subsidies and supportive regulations. 
Eroding political influence of incumbent 
industries, declining political support, 
removal of supportive policies, introduction 
of disruptive policies. 
Cultural Positive discourses and visions attract attention, 
create cultural enthusiasm and increase socio-
political legitimacy. 
Negative cultural discourses undermine the 
legitimacy of existing regimes (e.g. coal and 
climate change, diesel cars and air quality). 
3. Socio-technical analysis of the German electricity transition (1990-
2016) 
To make the socio-technical approach more concrete, we provide an illustrative analysis of the 
unfolding German electricity transition (Figure 3). Our aim is to illustrate the multiple economic, 
social, political and cultural processes at work, together with the interactions between the three levels 
illustrated in Figure 2. Our focus is the transition towards renewable energy technologies (RETs) that 
occurred over the period 1990-2016, which laid the foundation for the official energy transition policy 
(Energiewende) adopted in 2011. 
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Figure 3: German electricity generation by source, 1990–2016 (TWh)  
 
 
Source:  AGEnergiebilanzen 
 
German R&D programs in wind and solar-PV were stimulated by the 1970s’ oil crises, but deployment 
initially remained limited because of poor performance and high costs.16 During the 1980s, small wind 
turbines were adopted to some degree by environmentally motivated citizen groups, farmers and 
smaller utilities, which in turn helped to stimulate a positive discourse around green energy.17 The 1986 
Chernobyl accident was a landscape shock that stimulated the engagement of anti-nuclear activists who 
wanted to demonstrate the feasibility of alternatives.18 The accident also hardened negative public 
attitudes towards nuclear power, leading to an institutionalization of views that had been advanced by 
an active anti-nuclear movement in preceding years.19 This discursive ‘crack’ in the regime was 
plastered over by successive Conservative-Liberal governments, who continued to support nuclear 
power. 
The nurturing of RET-niches continued in the 1990s, most notably through the 1991 Feed-In-
Law that obliged utilities to connect RETs to the grid and to purchase renewable electricity at 90% of 
the retail price. Earlier proposals for RET market support had been defeated in Parliament, but the 1991 
proposal succeed ‘by accident’ as the government was preoccupied with German re-unification.20 The 
Feed-in-Tariff (FiT) made onshore wind deployment economically feasible, stimulating significant 
deployment in the 1990s (Figure 4). The success of German turbine manufacturers (Enercon, Husumer 
Schiffswerft, Tacke) expanded the RET support coalition and attracted industrial policy support in the 
peripheral regions of Northern Germany. The FiT was too low, however, to make solar-PV and biogas 
economically feasible. Green NGOs, industrial firms (including Siemens) and the German Biogas 
Association lobbied for more support, based on the discourse of ecological modernization, but with 
limited direct success.18 The green advocacy coalition was successful, however, in defeating a 1997 
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environmental groups, solar and wind associations, metal and machine workers, farmer groups and 
church groups led to the rejection of the proposal by the German Parliament.16 
 
Figure 4: Electricity generation from German renewable energy technologies, excluding hydro, 1990-
2016 (TWh) 
 
Source:  AGEnergiebilanzen  
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enabled a ‘social opening up’ of the electricity sector18, with farmers, municipal utilities, households, 
communities, project developers, and other industries entering the generation market (Table 2). In 
contrast, incumbent utilities had only limited involvement in RET-deployment, producing only 6.5% of 
non-hydro renewable electricity in 2010 (Table 2). 
Table 2: Ownership of installed capacity of different renewable electricity technologies in Germany in 
2010 (%) 
 Households Farmers Banks, 
funds 
Project 
developers 
Municipal 
utilities 
Industry Four 
major 
utilities 
others 
Wind 51.5 1.8 15.5 21.3 3.4 2.3 2.1 2.2 
Biogas 0.1 71.5 6.2 13.1 3.1 0.1 0.1 5.7 
Biomass 2.0 0 3.0 6.9 24.3 41.5 9.6 12.7 
Solar-PV 39.3 21.2 8.1 8.3 2.6 19.2 0.2 1.1 
Source: Ref 25 
 
The Big 4 utilities continued to focus on growth in this period, increasing their stock prices (Figure 5) 
through European and global expansions.26 They also enjoyed windfall profits from the European 
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), since they were allowed to raise wholesale prices to reflect the 
opportunity cost of carbon allowances, despite receiving those allowances for free.27 After years of 
lobbying, the utilities also scored a political victory when the newly elected (2009) Conservative-
Liberal government decided to overturn the earlier nuclear phase-out decision. Their public reputation 
deteriorated towards the end of the decade, however, because they were increasingly seen as large 
oligopolists that faced insufficient competition, generated excessive profits and ignored public 
concerns. After 2008, the utilities faced growing economic pressures from the financial crisis (which 
depressed economic activity and thereby electricity demand), the expansion of renewables (which 
reduced the market share of fossil plants), and decreasing wholesale electricity prices (because of 
declining coal prices and low marginal costs of renewables, which means they are dispatched first in 
power generation). These developments led to a decline in net income from 2011 onwards.26 
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Figure 5: Share price performance of German electricity companies normalized by starting date* 
 
Source: Finanzen.net. * Note: Vattenfall is not included because it is a Swedish state-owned company. 
 
The 2011-2016 period saw the destabilization of the electricity regime and further diffusion of RETs, 
which accounted for 29% of electricity generation in 2016. The Fukushima accident (2011) was a 
landscape shock that led the government to perform a U-turn, and re-introduce the nuclear phase-out, 
with a target date of 2022. The government also introduced an economy-wide energy transition policy 
(Energiewende) that included ambitious targets for renewable electricity (35% by 2020, 40-45% by 
2025, 55-60% by 2035 and 80% by 2050). Regime destabilization thus created opportunities for the 
diffusion of renewables, as predicted by the MLP. Diffusion was also driven by endogenous dynamics, 
such as policy support, positive discourses and declining RET-prices. The price of PV-modules, for 
instance, decreased more than 65% between 2007 and 2011, as a result of scale economies in Chinese 
production, oversupply, and price-dumping.28 Growing market demand boosted German solar-PV 
generation, which increased from 6.6 TWh in 2009 to 38.2 TWh in 2016 (Figure 4). 
But these developments also had unintended negative consequences. For example: 1) many 
German PV-manufacturers went bankrupt because of Chinese competition, which eroded the strength 
of the green growth discourse; 2) renewables deployment (especially solar-PV) increased EEG-
surcharges from 1.3 eurocent/kWh in 2009 to 6.24 eurocent/kWh in 2014, helping to make German 
retail electricity prices the highest in Europe;22 3) the growing size and regressive nature29 of these 
surcharges encouraged political opposition, including from utilities and the Economics Ministry; and 4) 
the growing proportion of intermittent renewables threatened grid stability and increased wholesale 
price volatility in both German and neighboring electricity markets - with negative prices on sunny, 
windy days when supply exceeded demand. 
These problems led to government efforts to contain the speed and direction of the electricity 
transition. Cost-reduction attempts from 2010 onwards led to several downward adjustments in the 
EEG-policy.30 The substantial 2012 adjustment in EEG subsidies sharply slowed solar-PV deployment 
(Figure 4). Another adjustment in 2014 announced that feed-in-tariffs would be replaced by a bidding 
system for target capacity by 2017, which is likely to introduce more uncertainty. To facilitate market 
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integration of RETs, the government introduced new policies to stimulate direct marketing of 
renewable electricity.31 
 Another reason for introducing these containment policies was that the Big-4 utilities were 
facing substantial economic problems. The immediate shut-down of eight nuclear reactors in 2011, and 
the closure of the remainder by 2022, threatened major financial losses. Low wholesale prices and 
competition from RETs undermined the profitability of many conventional power plants, leading to 
doubts about the viability of traditional business models. In 2012, the CEO of EnBW stated in the 
annual report that: “…I see a paradigm shift in the energy sector that questions the traditional business 
model of many power supply companies.” A confidential paper titled ‘RWE’s Corporate Story’ raised 
gloomy prospects: “…The massive erosion of the wholesale prices caused by the growth of German 
photovoltaics constitutes a serious problem for RWE which may even threaten the company’s 
survival.”22 In this volatile context, Big-4 utilities began strategic reorientation activities, searching for 
viable business models. In 2014, E.ON decided to split its business into two separate companies: one 
would focus on renewables, distribution grids and service activities, the other would hold conventional 
assets in large-scale electricity production and trading activities. In 2015, Vattenfall offered its German 
lignite activities for sale, which represented a major retreat from the German market. In 2015, RWE 
announced plans to separate its renewables, grid and retail business in a new subcompany.26 These 
problems raised concerns in government, which perceived the utilities as ‘too big to fail’. The 
government therefore aimed to slow RET-expansion and to strengthen support for the utilities. 
Conventional power plants were increasingly framed as complementary to RETs and as necessary (in 
the short to medium-term) for guaranteeing the stability of the electricity system. Attention also turned 
to new policies like demand-side response and ‘capacity markets’, with the latter rewarding generators 
for providing available capacity rather than electricity generation.31 The government also stimulated the 
deployment of offshore wind, which provided an attractive diversification opportunity for incumbent 
utilities because of size and cost structures. 
This brief case study demonstrates several core themes of the socio-technical perspective. First, 
the German energy transition was clearly a multi-dimensional process, with complex interactions 
between techno-economic, business, social, political and cultural dimensions whose relative 
importance changed over time. 
Second, the transition can be fruitfully analyzed as struggles between niche-innovations (linked 
to new entrants) and existing regimes (linked to incumbents). Exogenous landscape pressures 
(Fukushima, financial-economic crisis) played important roles in destabilizing the regime and creating 
windows of opportunity for the diffusion of niche-innovations. The success of niche-innovations also 
depended upon endogenous drivers, such as supportive policies, price/performance improvements, new 
business creation, positive discourses and broad advocacy coalitions. 
Thirdly, the transition was non-linear and characterized by surprises. For example: 1) the solar-
PV boom after the mid-2000s was not foreseen; 2) the green growth success story was disrupted by 
cheaper Chinese imports that bankrupted several German firms; 3) the Fukushima accident was an 
influential external shock that triggered a policy U-turn; and 4) the expansion of intermittent 
renewables disrupted normal market functioning, creating the need for fundamental redesign. Such 
non-linearities and surprises are common in transitions, implying that policymaking needs to be 
flexible and adaptive. 
Fourthly, the transition was full of political conflict and struggles. There were continuous 
struggles, for instance, over nuclear policy. Utilities fought the 2002 phase-out decision, lobbied the 
Conservative-Social Democrat government (2005-2009) for a roll-back, succeeded in 2009, were faced 
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with a U-turn in 2011 and have since sought financial compensation for the nuclear phase-out via court 
cases. There were also struggles between Ministries over responsibilities and priorities. In 2002, for 
instance, the Red-Green government transferred the responsibility for renewable energy policy from 
the Economics Ministry to the Ministry for Environmental Affairs, which was more positively oriented 
towards RETs. In 2014, the government transferred this responsibility back to the Economics Ministry. 
Another battleground was the resistance from German utilities against renewables support policies. In 
1995, utilities contested the legality of the Feed-In-Law in German courts and the European Court of 
Justice. They also tried to delegitimize RETs by framing them as expensive and unreliable. Since 2009, 
this discourse gained traction with Conservative-led government coalitions. Combined with concerns 
over the economic viability of utilities and the impact of rising prices on electricity consumers, the 
government started downscaling EEG-support. This last point also highlights the importance of dealing 
with potential ‘losers’ in transitions, something we address further below. 
4. Status of low-carbon transitions in different domains 
Broadening out from this case study, we use the MLP to briefly appraise the status of low-carbon 
transitions in different domains. Progress is greatest in electricity systems, where niche-innovations like 
wind and solar-PV are diffusing rapidly32, moving from phase two to three in countries such as 
Denmark, Portugal, Germany (see Figure 3 above) and the UK (Figure 6). The result is substantial 
disruption of existing regimes (e.g. economic problems for utilities, threats to supply security) and 
major adjustments to those regimes (e.g. interconnection, electricity storage, smart grids, demand-side 
response, market redesign). However, other low-carbon innovations such as CCS and nuclear energy 
are progressing much slower than anticipated, owing to implementation problems related to public 
opposition, industry resistance and lack of political will.33 
 
Figure 6: UK electricity generation by fuel type, 1990–2016 (TWh) 
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Source: Digest of UK Energy Statistics 
 
Low-carbon transitions have less momentum in passenger transport, where the petroleum-fueled auto-
mobility regime is still deeply entrenched in most Western countries. Some niche-innovations are 
moving from phase one to two, particularly hybrid-electric vehicles (HEV), plug-in hybrids (PHEV), 
and battery-electric vehicles (BEV). In 2015, more than 1.26 million PHEVs and BEVs were on the 
road globally, and they exceeded 1% of new vehicle sales in five countries ( Sweden, Denmark, France, 
China, UK) and 5% in two more (Norway and the Netherlands).34 In 2017 Volvo announced that it will 
cease production of conventional vehicles by 2019. However, while many analysts extrapolate these 
positive trends into the future, others are more cautious because low-carbon transport innovations have 
a history of hype-disappointment cycles (Figure 7).5 It seems as if BEVs are currently experiencing a 
second period of hype, after an earlier one followed by disappointment in the 1990s. Then again, it is 
also possible that organizations such as the IEA will be proven correct and that a genuine breakthrough 
and accelerated diffusion of BEVs will take place in many countries over the next decade. 
 
Figure 7: Hype-disappointment cycles for green car propulsion technologies 
 
  
Source: Ref. 14 
 
Low-carbon transitions in agriculture and food are also progressing slowly. Agriculture is a very 
dispersed regime (geographically and via commodity chains), with supermarkets and food processing 
occupying powerful positions between consumers and farmers. Low-carbon niche-innovations exist 
(e.g. artificial meat, organic food, manure digestion, farmers markets, vegetable box schemes), but have 
limited momentum because of high costs, cultural attachments to existing diets, weak and fragmented 
policies, and industry reluctance.35 
Heat and building regimes are also fairly stable owing to the slow turn-over of stock, the high 
cost of low-carbon alternatives, industry lock-in and entrenched user practices. Incremental innovations 
(efficient boilers, insulation, double glazing) have improved the energy performance of buildings but 
opportunities for further deployment are declining. In contrast, radical niche-innovations, such as 
whole-house retrofits, passive houses, heat pumps and district heating networks have relatively little 
momentum and continue to face multiple obstacles such as high upfront costs, split incentives, limited 
consumer familiarity, absence of supporting infrastructure and limited supply chain skills.36 
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One reason for the more rapid transition in electricity is that the relevant technologies are easy 
to target and policies like feed-in-tariffs have been highly successful in reducing investment risk. 
However, this begs the question of why similar policies have not worked as well in other systems. We 
suggest that the electricity system has three characteristics that facilitate more rapid transition. First, the 
electricity grid acts as a buffer, making it possible to make radical changes to the generation mix with 
only limited consumer involvement. Consumers typically pay for low-carbon electricity generation 
through their electricity bills, but many are unaware of this indirect involvement mechanism. This is 
different in food, mobility, heat and buildings, where consumers need to actively decide to purchase 
low-carbon innovations, which are often costly and have different functional characteristics. Second, 
electricity is an undifferentiated product, meaning that consumers do not experience changes in 
functional characteristics with low-carbon electricity and do not need to change their practices. Again, 
this is not the case for mobility, food and buildings. Third, it is easier for policymakers to interact with 
a few centralized oligopolistic utilities than with millions of farmers, installers or small building 
companies (although countries like Germany and Denmark are counter-examples in the electricity 
sector). But despite these differences in system characteristics, meeting ambitious climate targets 
requires accelerated transitions in all sectors. This in turn, requires more differentiated policies, which 
we address next. 
5. Lessons for managing low-carbon transitions   
Governing low-carbon transitions is complex, because of uncertainties (about the future price and 
performance of radical innovations, social acceptance, consumer interest, policy support), 
disagreements (about desirable solutions, policies, costs and benefits) and distributed power 
(policymakers are not all-powerful and depend on other actors).37 It is therefore insufficient to rely 
solely upon technically rational criteria for decision-making, in which experts use computer models to 
determine an ‘optimal’ transition path which is then implemented by policymakers. Our socio-technical 
approach to low-carbon transitions highlights at least four important lessons for low-carbon policy. 
Focus on policy mixes, not isolated instruments 
With regard to policy instruments, a sociotechnical approach reinforces the argument that policymakers 
should not rely exclusively upon single policy instruments - particularly carbon pricing which 
continues to face major political obstacles.38 Instead, policymakers should mobilise a range of policies, 
such as financial instruments (taxes, subsidies, grants, loans), regulatory instruments (standards, laws, 
performance targets) and processual instruments39 (demonstration projects, network management, 
public debates, consultations, foresight exercises, roadmaps). The appropriate mix is likely to vary 
between countries and domains, depending on political cultures and stakeholder configurations.40 Even 
in Germany, the success of a ‘demand-pull’ instrument such as the feed-in tariffs only worked as well 
as it did because it formed part of a broader policy mix including ‘supply-push’ mechanisms such as 
subsidies for research and ‘systemic measures’ such as collaborative research projects and systems of 
knowledge exchange.41 
As a general strategy for managing transitions, it is best to first nurture low-carbon niche-
innovations and support coalitions and then to enhance selection pressures.38 42 Concretely, in phase 
one and two of transitions, policymakers should prioritize processual and innovation support policies 
(e.g. demonstration projects, foresight and scenario workshops, R&D subsidies, feed-in tariffs), aimed 
at creating ‘protected spaces’ for niche innovations that encourage learning, network building, initial 
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deployment, and articulation of visions and discourses.43 44 In phase three, when niche-innovations 
have acquired internal momentum, policy-making should become more selective by increasing 
pressures on the regime via economic incentives (e.g. carbon-pricing) or stricter regulations. The niche-
related support coalitions, which were built in phase one and two, may help counter the political 
resistance and fight-back from incumbent actors in phase three.4 
Analyze politics, in addition to policy 
Because low-carbon transitions are inevitably political, scientists should provide analysis of policy (and 
politics) as well as for policy.45 46 Political scientists have developed a number of theoretical models 
that both explain policy-making processes and provide useful insights for influencing those processes. 
For example, theories of policy networks see policymaking as a deeply political process involving 
negotiations, compromises and the building of coalitions with stakeholders.47 Acknowledging 
disagreements and distributed power, politics is the ‘art of the possible’ rather than the ‘calculation of 
the optimal’. This suggests that more expensive transitions may be preferable if stakeholder support 
makes their implementation more feasible. To support policymakers, scholars could offer better 
analyses of the interpretations, interests, resources and strategies of different groups.48 In other words, 
policy analysts should focus more on the complex dynamics involved in political struggles, social 
acceptance and governance, where factors can both serve as constraints or catalysts for accelerated 
transition. 
Similarly, theories of incrementalism49 and muddling through50 see policy implementation as a 
process of improvisation, experimentation, and learning-by-doing. This is particularly appropriate for 
managing the non-linear development of radical innovations, which may lead to surprises and 
unintended consequences that require flexibility and adjustments. To support policymakers, scholars 
could offer better analyses of the determinants of success for niche-innovations, including the role of 
demonstration projects, network building and learning processes.43 44 
Broaden the solution space, beyond supply-side technology and economics  
As noted, low carbon transitions are proceeding at very different speeds in different parts of the 
economy. These widely different outcomes are only partly linked to the relative cost of abatement in 
these different sectors, or to the specific characteristics of those sectors. They also reflect blind spots on 
the part of policymakers and analysts - which in turn are linked to the cognitive constraints imposed by 
existing regimes (restricting the perceived solution space), the inertia and path dependence of those 
regimes and the political influence of the relevant incumbents. 
The most obvious example of this is the bias towards energy supply, rather than energy demand 
technologies - visible within energy R&D programs, deployment support programs, integrated 
assessment models and the overall policy mix.51 Thirteen of Pacala and Socolow’s climate stabilization 
wedges, for instance, focus on supply; only two wedges address demand (reduced use of vehicles, 
efficient buildings).52 Some reasons for this bias are51: energy supply technologies are small in number, 
similar in configuration, characterized by good data availability (which enables modeling) and 
provided by a small number of well-organized and politically powerful sectors. Large supply-side 
investments are also politically salient with straightforward evaluation metrics (e.g. £/kWh), lending 
themselves to targeted and dedicated policy support. In contrast, end-use technologies (washing 
machines, televisions, boilers, internal combustion engines, ICT devices) are large in number, diverse 
in configuration, focused primarily upon other services, and are supplied by a large number of sectors 
with less political power. The impact of efficiency improvements in those technologies (which have 
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been substantial in some instances, e.g. refrigerators and light bulbs) is largely invisible, and the 
systems in which they are embedded are more difficult to target through policy intervention. The net 
result is a relative neglect of demand-side opportunities within climate policy, despite their multiple 
social benefits53 and the expectation that they will account for more than half of the total global carbon 
abatement over the next century.54 
A second example is the bias towards technological solutions, rather than broader changes in 
individual routines and social practices - such as more cycling and walking, car sharing, eating less 
meat, extending product life and purchasing second-hand or used items. In combination, these have the 
potential to provide significant emission reductions.55 56 But despite this potential, it remains difficult 
for policymakers to deliberately and substantially change user practices in low-carbon directions, for 
fear of being accused of being an interventionist ‘nanny state’.57 
From a socio-technical perspective, approaches to stimulate end-use technologies or behavior 
change should go beyond the dominant individual perspective, which focuses either on changing prices 
or on information provision (e.g. telling people it would be good for the climate if they adjust 
thermostat settings, turn off unneeded lights, or operate washing machines at full-loads). The literature 
on technological domestication emphasizes that consumers do not just buy new technologies but also 
embed them in their daily lives, which entails cognitive work (learning about the artefact and 
developing new competencies), symbolic work (articulation of new interpretive categories and cultural 
conventions) and practical work (adjustment of user routines to match the new technology).58 59 The 
literature on user practices also suggests that substantial behaviour change usually involves co-evolving 
changes in skills, meanings and material components.60 Pricing and information strategies should 
therefore be complemented with polices aimed at learning (e.g. demonstration projects that address not 
just technical performance, but also users routines), public debates, and inclusion of trusted 
intermediary actors (e.g. consumer organizations, retailers, NGOs, community groups).61 
Actively manage phase-outs, in addition to stimulating innovation 
Many analysts and planners emphasize the necessity of introducing niche-innovations, but this can 
obscure an equal need to phase-out existing, carbon-intensive regimes.62 Such phase-out policies could 
include: 1) regulations that reduce emissions from specific technologies or sectors; 2) changing market 
rules for decarbonisation e.g. through a carbon tax or pricing; 3) policies to force social discussion and 
debate, such as the creation of new committees or networks; and 4) reduced support (such as tax breaks 
or subsidies) for high-carbon technologies. 
 The political resistance to phase-out is likely to be intense. Sovacool discussed different 
techniques for estimating global energy subsidies, showing that assessments range from $1.9 to $5.3 
trillion (on a post-tax basis) per year, which mostly benefit coal, oil, and natural gas.63 On the top-end, 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), using an approach that monetized the ‘full social costs’, 
estimated that, in 2015, global fossil fuel subsidies amounted to $5.3 trillion on a ‘post-tax basis’ 
equivalent to 6.5% of global GDP.64 According to the IMF data, coal and petroleum still receive the 
lion’s share of these subsidies; with the largest subsidies in absolute terms being in China ($2.3 
trillion), the United States ($699 billion), and Russia ($335 billion). This means that the financial stakes 
of decarbonisation are vast— and the losers significant. 
The potential job losses associated with displacing coal, natural gas, and oil may also lead to 
resistance. Some of these skills and jobs may be transferable to other sectors, such as offshore oil 
platform engineers putting their expertise into offshore wind turbine foundations, but many will not. A 
related concern is that higher income groups tend to be the first to adopt niche-innovations such as 
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solar panels, electric vehicles and zero-energy buildings.65 Hence, subsidising those technologies could 
unwittingly exacerbate income inequality, especially if these subsidies are funded by levies on energy 
bills. 
A pragmatic solution to managing, or at least ameliorating ‘losses’, is to actively plan for them, 
and then provide adjustment packages for those most harmed—an action that may also undercut some 
of the political opposition against decarbonisation (and one that could be funded by carbon pricing). In 
simple terms, losers need compensation so they will be less likely to hinder transitions. For instance, 
the German phase-out of coal subsidies involved a savings package for unemployed miners and subsidy 
reform packages introduced by Iran, Namibia, the Philippines, Turkey, and the United Kingdom 
provide similar compensating measures to affected groups.63 Such efforts ensure that what is necessary 
to protect the climate is also just for the most vulnerable in society. 
6. Conclusion  
Techno-economic approaches in energy studies are crucial for analyzing and managing low-carbon 
transitions. But since transitions are disruptive, contested, and non-linear, they cannot be reduced to a 
technical deployment challenge. Nor are they driven solely by financial incentives, regulation and 
information provision. Low-carbon transitions also involve social, political and cultural processes, and 
changes in consumer practices. The multi-level perspective offers a big picture analytical framework 
that accommodates these broader processes and helps explain both stability and change. Energy and 
climate policy should not only include finance and regulation, but also stimulate learning and 
experimentation and the building of coalitions that develop emerging niche-innovations and support 
political struggles. Analysts and policymakers thus should look beyond single policy mechanisms such 
as carbon pricing and consider how a range of instruments can be woven into an effective mix. 
Analysts should also recognize that disagreement and contestation are central to low-carbon transitions 
and consider how best to accommodate these conflicts rather than ignore them. This will require 
aligning climate policy with broader policy objectives, minimizing the impact on low-income groups 
and providing explicit compensation. To understand and address these issues, techno-economic 
approaches should be complemented with frameworks that address the socio-technical dynamics of 
low-carbon transitions.66 
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